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Did ‘Import Substitution’ Promote 
Structural Change? 
A Comparative Study of Manufacturing 
Productivity in Mexico, Argentina, and 
Brazil, 1935-1975  
 
 
“For all its faults, IS (import substitution) promoted rapid structural change.  
Labor moved from agriculture to industry, and within industry from  
lower-productivity activities to higher-productivity ones.  
So much for the inherent inefficiency of IS policies!” 




Import substitution was perhaps one of the most debated topics on economic policy in 
Latin America during the middle of the twentieth century. Promoting a country’s 
industrialization by reducing imports and substituting them with locally produced 
industrial products was a policy consensus until the late 1970s. The debt crises and the 
subsequent economic collapse suffered in the 1980s produced a radical change in the views 
of the development strategy based on trade protectionism. Thereafter, a vast strand of 
policy studies sponsored by international organizations analyzing the growth performance 
of Latin America emerged suggesting new policy directions.153 The culprit was clear: 
excessive protectionism granted by industrial policies generated large distortions, resource 
misallocation and low productivity. In other words, import substitution policies failed to 
deliver sustained growth in the region. However, there were other views.  
                                                          
153 Seminal cross-country policy studies suggesting structural reforms to liberalize trade during the 1980s are 






Various economists from the United Nations - Economic Commission for Latin 
America and the Caribbean (UN-ECLAC) suggested that import substitution should not 
bear the weight of failure for the collapse of the 1980s; instead, external shocks, debt 
mismanagement, and political instability were the underlying causes of an unfavorable 
environment that ‘interrupted’ the rapid pace of industrial productivity in the region.154 
According to that view, the manufacturing sector served as an ‘engine of growth’ and tariff 
policies targeting this sector generated a process of structural transformation in domestic 
industries; fostering the reallocation of employment from low to high-productivity 
activities. Hence, import substitution policies favored the expansion of industry, 
employment, and technological learning, yielding as a result high aggregate productivity 
growth, and ultimately an increase in the standards of living of Latin Americans during 
those years (1930s-1970s).155  
Despite the vast literature on this topic, existing quantitative evidence on the 
industrial sector has been largely focused on the last years of protectionism (late-1970s) 
and the liberalization period (1980s-1990s) overlooking the dynamics and productivity 
performance in previous decades (1930-1960s): lack of consistent data disaggregated by 
industrial activity has obscured empirical research preventing a systematic assessment of 
the effects of protectionism on productivity prior to 1970. 
This chapter proposes to add breadth to the existing historical literature on Latin 
American industrialization by exploring the dynamics of productivity growth within 
manufacturing industries during the period of import substitution from a comparative 
perspective. Relying on official industrial censuses, it covers the period right after the 
Great Depression (1935/39) until the mid-1970s (1974/75).  
The relevance of this study is related to the current industrial policy debate in the 
region; despite marked productivity improvements, major Latin American countries are 
still underperforming, falling short of the reform expectations from trade liberalizations, 
and thus, lagging behind high-income OECD countries.156 As a consequence, in recent 
years several economists have claimed that Latin American policymakers should 
‘experiment’ with new growth strategies including pro-active industrial policies to induce 
a ‘growth-enhancing’ structural change and boost productivity growth as accomplished 
allegedly during the years of import substitution.157  
                                                          
154 For e.g. Fajnzylber (1983), and Macario (1964). See a review in Baer (1994) and Ocampo and Ros (2011). 
155 See for instance, Astorga et al. (2005), Astorga et al. (2003), Cardoso and Fishlow (1992), Di Maio (2009), 
Katz and Kosacoff (2003), Moreno-Brid and Ros (2009), and Thorp (1998). 
156 See Pagés (2010) for a survey of the recent productivity performance of Latin American countries in 
comparison with other OECD (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development) countries. 






These growth strategies based on upgrading the quality of economic institutions, 
also include a typology of industrial policies that resemble the ‘old’ development strategies 
from the years of protectionism (e.g. Rodrik, 2005). These policies are mainly characterized 
by a series of macroeconomic stimulus, industry subsidies, and trade (and non-trade) 
barriers.  
However, in the midst of this renewed debate it is necessary to revisit the claim 
that protectionist policies were indeed effective in the past as several authors argue. The 
argument advanced in this study is that one of the most important channels through which 
tariff policies may have impacted growth is by changing the sectoral distribution of 
employment towards the most productive activities that increase aggregate productivity 
(total manufacturing output per worker).  
Therefore, if tariffs were important in driving labor productivity growth through 
this channel (structural change), then protected manufacturing sectors should have 
experienced faster output growth than non-protected sectors or have higher levels of labor 
productivity.  
Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina have been exemplified as the powerhouses of import 
substitution policies in Latin America after the Great Depression; therefore, this study 
takes their manufacturing industries as a benchmark to provide a comparative analysis 
seeking a relationship between labor productivity growth and industry protection during 
the middle decades of the twentieth century.  
This chapter examines the existence of a structural bonus/burden within 
manufacturing industries on whether there were significant labor input shifts from less to 
more productive manufacturing branches induced by tariff policies. With this purpose, the 
analysis employs disaggregated data from official industrial censuses and produce new 
estimates of labor productivity for 1935/39, 1950, and 1975. Then, it decomposes the 
components of productivity growth in manufacturing industries by applying a shift-share 
analysis to this newly compiled data. 
 
4.2 Literature review and recent debate 
 
Structural change is broadly defined as a process of reallocation of labor, capital, and 
intermediate inputs from traditional to modern economic activities.158 This is typically 
characterized by a change in the economic structure that involves the movement of the 
labor force from low-productivity to high-productivity activities generating a rise in overall 
productivity and an expansion of aggregate incomes.159 With rising overall incomes, a 
decline occurs in the share of food consumption (Engel’s law) and a rise in the share of 
                                                          
158 See a synthesis and broad quantitative evaluation in Herrendorf et al., (2014). 






resources allocated to investment. In a closed economy framework, this shift in demand 
away from agricultural goods aided by a faster rise of productivity in manufacturing 
produces a natural reallocation of production inputs (Syrquin, 1988).  
Large shifts in factors inputs are considered as part of a secular process across the 
stages of economic development; from agriculture to industry, and subsequently from 
industry to services. As argued by Chenery (1986), structural transformation within the 
industrial sector may entail shifting the pattern of specialization from traditional to more 
sophisticated goods, a process which would generate higher productivity growth at the 
aggregate level.  
 Within a sector, this structural transformation can be ‘partially’ visible on the 
reallocation of labor. Because of the well-known existence of large inter-sectoral differences 
in labor productivity (i.e. temporal disequilibrium in factor markets), labor tends to shift 
towards more productive sectors.160 Determined by changes in domestic demand, and by 
the patterns of international trade (comparative advantage), this process of structural 
change can be accelerated by industrial policies, such as import substitution.  
The primary goal of substituting imported goods is to change the country’s pattern 
of trade with the purpose of upgrading and/or developing a new competitive industrial 
base.161 Erecting a variety of barriers to the importation of foreign goods and substituting 
them for domestically produced goods, these policies promote new economic activities that 
require the reallocation of the labor force (and other inputs such as capital and 
intermediates) across and within sectors of the economy. The replacement of imports (of 
consumer, intermediate, and capital goods) with domestic production comes from the 
premise that by creating ‘infant’ industries and targeting existing ‘priority’ ones with a 
variety of industry incentives, the economy would be more diversified, self-sufficient, and 
resilient to the fluctuations of the international business cycle. This ultimately would 
enhance domestic welfare over time.  
Protection reduces the competitiveness of newly import-competing products by 
raising the price of their output in domestic markets to favor local producers. In addition 
to the ‘traditional’ import barriers such as tariffs, and quotas, the protectionist ‘toolbox’ 
can be extensive and accompanied by a series of measures including: subsidies, tax breaks, 
low interest loans directed to selected industries, and also the manipulation of exchange 
rates (Bruton, 1998).  
                                                          
160 As formally exposed by Syrquin (1984: 78): “because of the shift of labor from low to high (average) 
productivity sectors, the growth of the aggregate labor productivity exceeds the weighted average of the 
corresponding sectoral growth rates”. 
161 The technical definition of import substitution generally refers to the position when the import share of 
the supply of a specific good declines in relation to that of domestic production either because a new tariff 





  Although the original argument (‘infant industry’) for protectionism as a 
comprehensive set of industrial policies dates back to the classical work of Alexander 
Hamilton (1790) and later of Friedrich List (1841), a modern theory of protection has 
emerged in the last decades setting a case for industry policy. Currently, it is possible to 
identify three strands of approaches on the welfare gains of protectionism: models with a 
Schumpeterian approach, a Marshallian approach, and a strategic trade argument.  
The first strand (Schumpeterian) argues that targeting of high-technology sectors 
via a combination of trade protection, subsidies, and tax breaks may provide large 
incentives to invest in new technologies and processes. This, in turn, would lead to a stage 
of ‘accumulation’ characterized by rapid growth in productivity, and then to a phase of 
‘assimilation’ where innovation processes enhance welfare and competitiveness (Fagerberg, 
1994; Nelson and Pack, 1999). 
 On the other hand, authors who are inclined to support the Marshallian approach 
and/or the strategic trade argument claim that the temporary protection (targeting) of a 
sector/industry that displays Marshallian externalities enhances productivity growth by 
raising total output in those sectors. It is argued that sectors with these externalities can 
arise through localized industry-level knowledge spillovers, input-output linkages together 
with transportation costs which give rise to geographic agglomeration of industries 
(Krugman, 1991).162 
At the empirical level, there are several cross-country studies that have analyzed 
the effect of tariffs on welfare and structural change, giving rise to the so-called ‘tariff–
growth paradox’. These studies have addressed with large country samples the shifting 
effects of tariff protection on economic growth over time; protection promoted growth 
before the Second World War, but inhibit it thereafter (e.g. Clemens and Williamson, 
2004; and Jacks, 2006).  In a related cross-country study, Irwin (2002) explored if trade 
tariffs had an impact on growth by shifting resources out of agriculture to industry during 
the nineteenth century. His findings suggest that although there was a correlation between 
tariffs and growth, the evidence is conditional on the country’s comparative advantage 
and the institutions in place. He concludes: “tariff policies are complex and vary greatly 
across countries in ways depending strongly on resources, institutions, and government 
strategies”.163 
Although there are empirical cross-country studies on structural change focused on 
the ‘total-economy’ and at a sectoral level (agriculture, manufacturing, and services) such 
as Timmer and de Vries (2009), Duarte and Restuccia (2010), Debowicz and Segal (2014) 
there are also several studies at the industry level. These studies have sought at a more 
disaggregated level a relationship between productivity growth and tariff protection; 
                                                          
162 See a full theoretical explanation in Harrison and Rodriguez-Clare (2009). 






however, with the exception of Baldwin and Krugman (1988), most of them have found 
little support for this relationship. Seminal studies are found in Krueger and Tuncer (1982) 
for the manufacturing industries in Turkey, Lee (1996) for South Korea, and Beason and 
Weinstein (1996) for Japan. 
Moreover, at the micro-level (plant level) studies using more recent data for a 
sample of manufacturing plants such as Muendler (2004) for Brazil, Pavcnik (2000) for 
Mexico, Eslava et al. (2010) for Colombia, have tended to confirm this weak relationship. 
One of the most peculiar cases is shown in Luzio and Greenstein (1995) for the unsuccessful 
attempt of the Brazilian government to promote productivity growth within the 
microprocessor industry through tariff protection in the mid-1980s. 
In a study on the dynamics of manufacturing industries, Timmer and Szirmai (2000) 
presented evidence testing the structural-bonus hypothesis for a group of Asian countries. 
Using a shift-share method, they explored if labor and capital shifted from less productive 
manufacturing branches towards more productive branches. The results failed to confirm 
this effect, however, after this study, further analyses using this method have been carried 
out for other regions (except for Latin American manufacturing).164 Katz (2000) analyzed 
through a sample of Latin American manufacturing industries from 1970 to 1992 the 
process of productivity catch-up relative to the levels of United States. However, in that 
study there was a limited year-coverage for the period of protectionism and the 
phenomenon of shifting resources within and between industrial branches (structural 




During the years of import substitution in Latin America, specifically for the period of 
‘explicit’ industrial protection between 1930 and 1975 the evidence on the link of 
productivity growth and manufacturing protection is still not clear.165 In fact, although 
the structural problems of the import substitution model in Latin America and its political 
and economic consequences were notably emphasized long ago in the seminal works from 
Albert Hirschman (1968), on the empirical side the issue on the dynamics of productivity 
growth for these years has remained speculative and controversial due to serious data 
problems (see e.g. Edwards, 1993).  
Whereas some authors have argued that overall productivity grew faster in Latin 
America thanks to protectionist policies than in any other period in the history of the 
                                                          
164 See also a comparison of Taiwan and South Korean manufacturing in Dollar and Sokoloff (1994). 
165 It is labelled ‘explicit protection’ because prior to this period trade tariffs levels were also high as they 
were inherited from post-independence tax regimes. It was after the Great Depression when governments 
embraced tariff policies in the official discourse as elements of their industrial promotion programs (Sokoloff 





region (e.g. Astorga et al. 2003; Thorp, 1998), others consider Latin America’s current 
productivity gap (post-1980) and stagnant growth performance as a legacy of the policies 
of the import substitution period (1930-c.1975).166 The latter studies argue that erecting 
barriers to international trade and prolonging them for more than three decades meant 
missing the opportunity to build technological capabilities and upgrading domestic 
industrial structures based on competition and openness that would have raised labor 
productivity and spurring domestic innovation.167  
Moreover, although during this period of protectionism Latin American industries 
increased their shares in the world economy presumably aided by trade protection, it is 
claimed that the benefits of this ‘inward-looking development’ strategy were ‘offset’ by the 
consequential costs of distortions and rent-seeking activities that impacted negatively on 
productivity growth (Taylor, 1998). 
On the other hand, more recently McMillan and Rodrik (2011) have documented 
that after the import substitution period (after the liberalization in the 1980s) as trade 
barriers declined, Latin American industries became more productive and efficient, but 
this occurred at a major cost for the region: a productivity ‘growth-reducing’ structural 
change. These authors showed with sectoral-based evidence that liberalization instead of 
promoting the reallocation of employment towards the most productive sectors, shifted 
employment to the less productive such as agriculture and the informal sector.  
These findings have re-opened the debate not only on whether protectionism or 
openness are good for growth by inducing or reducing structural change, but on how the 
structure of regulation (i.e. protection) can be complementary to market competition 
within a sector.168 For instance, Nunn and Trefler (2010) showed with cross-country 
evidence that the skill-bias of the structure of tariffs is positively correlated with 
productivity growth. That is, there are productivity gains when tariffs targeted skill-
intensive industries. Yet, theirs and the other existing studies are cross-country 
correlations between productivity growth and tariff protection, and are based on GDP 
(Gross Domestic Product) per capita, a variable that neglects the shifting dynamics within 
industries. The present study aims to contribute in filling this lacuna by showing historical 
evidence with disaggregated data in manufacturing for Brazil, Mexico and Argentina. 
 
                                                          
166 See e.g. Cole et al. (2005), Edwards (2009), and Taylor (1998).  
167 There is growing body of empirical studies suggesting that export-oriented regimes lead to rapid 
technological development in labour-intensive industries. This is because exposure to international trade 
induce firms to acquire new technical expertise, facilitating the acquisition of new skills by workers and thus, 
increasing overall productivity. See a review in Syverson (2011) and Tybout (2000). 






4.3. Industry and protectionism in Latin America 
after 1930: a brief historical overview 
 
As mentioned previously, Latin American countries grew rapidly during protectionism. 
The years after 1930 and especially in the aftermath of the Second World War have been 
considered as the twentieth century’s ‘golden age’ of economic growth around the world 
and Latin America was not an exception.  
Countries like Mexico and Brazil grew even faster than some advanced industrial 
countries. By 1980 their real incomes (per capita) where nearly four and five-times the 
1930 levels respectively (see table 4.1). Although these GDP levels were still behind 
countries like the United States and the United Kingdom, the growth performance of Latin 
America during this period was unprecedented.169 
 
Table 4.1: Levels of GDP per capita in selected countries, 1930 and 1980 
(1990 Geary–Khamis dollars)  
Year United Kingdom United States Mexico Brazil Argentina 
1930 5 441 6 213 1 618 1 048 4 080 
1980 12 931 18 577 6 320 5 195 8 206 
Increase in GDP 
per capita (%) 237 300 390 495 205 
Source: Based on Maddison (2007) updated by Bolt and van Zanden (2014). 
 
Countries in the region experienced the ‘stylized’ sectoral transition from 
agriculture to industry, and to services. As figure 4.1 shows, in Mexico, Brazil and 
Argentina, the share of agricultural employment fell sharply followed by an increase in the 
industry and services employment shares. As in other major industrial economies such as 
the United Kingdom, the United States, and Italy, industrial policies attempted to speed 
up this process of structural change, which in some cases failed or had little effect.170 
After the outbreak of the Great Depression, protectionist policies enacted by the 
United States and the United Kingdom such as the Smoot-Hawley tariff in 1930 and the 
British General Tariff in 1931 affected negatively the commercial flows around the world. 
Latin American countries that were highly dependent on commodity-trade were severely 
                                                          
169 An exception is Argentina which had a relatively higher real GDP growth rates in the late nineteenth 
century. See Taylor (1994). 
170 See for example, Broadberry and Crafts (1996) for the case of the United Kingdom, Cole and Ohianian 





hit. Exports, tax revenues, and total employment collapsed by the early-1930s in major 
Latin American economies. Thereafter, a period of ‘explicit’ government interventions 
began aiming to foster domestic manufacturing industries.  
 
Figure 4.1: Sectoral employment shares of Mexico, Argentina, and Brazil, 1950-1980 (%)
 
Source: Data from GGDC 10-sector database (Timmer and de Vries, 2009). 
 
However, protectionist policies did not appear as a coordinated regional policy 
effort. Although many Latin American governments reacted with protectionist measures 
after 1930, high tariffs were already a common feature before the Great Depression (see 
for e.g. Coatsworth and Williamson, 2004). 
 
Figure 4.2: Average tariffs in Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and United States, 1930-1972 
    
Note: Unweighted average of country’s own tariffs (total economy).  










































Most of the conventional literature has portrayed protectionism in Latin America 
as part of nationalist projects influenced by ‘dependencia’ economists like Raúl Prebisch 
(1949). Yet, it was the administration of the United States back then who advised 
governments in Mexico and Argentina with plans and procedures to implement tariffs, tax 
reforms, and other industry incentives aiming to channel American private investments 
into the targeted industries (Maxfield and Nolt, 1990). 
Moreover, most of these protectionist measures were enacted gradually over the 
years at the behest of manufacturers and in response to the existing conditions of 
international markets (Haber, 2006). As figure 4.2 shows, although the average level of 
tariffs was higher than in the United States there was a clear downward trend in the 
protection of major Latin American countries from 1930 to the early-1970s. 
It is difficult to make a generalization of a single regional Latin American set of 
industrial policies since there was no uniform ‘development strategy’ based on import 
substitution. Instead, the ‘typology’ of protectionism erected in these countries was 
diverse. According to Baer (1994) and Teitel and Thoumi (1986) in Chile and Venezuela 
protection followed different stages based on gradual horizontal integration. In larger 
economies like Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina there was an ‘urge’ to foster industrialization 
based on vertical integration, i.e., promote both final consumer goods industries, and 
intermediate and the capital goods sector.  
 
Table 4.2: Average rate of effective protection in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico’s 
manufacturing in the mid-twentieth century 









Argentina 164 167 133 162 
Brazil  230 68 31 118 
Mexico 22 34 55 27 
Note: The effective rate of total protection is the percentage by which the value added 
at a particular stage of processing in a domestic industry can exceed what it would be 
without protection. Data for Argentina is for 1958 and Brazil for 1966 and Mexico for 
1959. 
Source: Little, Scitovsky and Scott (1970), p. 174. 
 
As is shown in figure 4.2, average total tariffs levels were higher in Mexico, but 
effective protection within manufacturing was much higher in Argentina and Brazil during 
this period. Table 4.2 shows this feature; whereas Argentina and Brazil’s effective 





in Mexico effective protection was relatively lower and more directed to the protection of 
capital goods.  
  
 
Latin American industrial corporatism after 1935 
 
Cliometric studies have tended to neglect a common factor that assisted industrial 
targeting programs: corporatism. This scheme was fundamental in mediating disputes 
between labor and capital. But more importantly, this allowed governments to expand 
their influence on manufacturing industries by creating special programs directed to 
facilitate high investment rates together with the coordination of domestic labor markets. 
Government officials along with company managers would set wage restraints to factory 
workers, and subsequently industrialists (owners) would reinvest their profits. Since most 
of employers’ associations and trade unions were attached to the state, corporatism aimed 
to control labor relations at the firm level, setting wage demands to the growth of labor 
productivity. 
Similarly to the European type of labor market coordination after the Second World 
War, manufacturing wages were set to move in tandem with productivity levels (see e.g. 
Eichengreen, 2008). Governments headed by Getúlio Vargas (1930-45, 1951-54) in Brazil; 
Lázaro Cárdenas (1934-40) and Manuel Ávila-Camacho (1940-46) in Mexico; and Agustin 
Justo (1932-38) and Juan Perón (1946-55) in Argentina, engaged effusively in corporatist 
schemes to facilitate the implementation of their industrial policies.  
In the following decades (1940s to 1960s), trade unions gained political ground in 
the industrial sector throughout the region. Labor rights and benefits were implemented 
such as a social security program and a minimum wage for urban workers. In Brazil, the 
coalition of political forces led by Getúlio Vargas brought an era of government 
interventions in the midst of conflicting interests between landowners, industrialists, and 
workers. Vargas advocated a program of economic modernization by imposing tariffs to 
favor agro-businesses and textile manufacturers. The so-called Estado Novo (new state) 
established a new Constitution which gave absolute power to the executive branch, a 
feature that facilitated discretionary policy measures. Although at the beginnings of 
Vargas’ administration the agenda tended to favor trade unions, it rather repressed them 
aiming to compact industry wages and prices (Colistete, 2001). 
Brazilian industrialists and unions were in a continuous conflict of interests and 
often trade unions controlled the economic agenda towards an economic reform that 
industrialists rejected. It has been argued that this lack of ‘social compact for growth’ 







 In the same period, the Mexican economy was experiencing a secular decline in 
mining and oil activities which where the leading sectors at the end of the nineteenth 
century. In turn, these were being replaced by agricultural and manufacturing production. 
The severe shortages of imported manufactured goods caused by the Great Depression in 
the United States raised their relative prices and thus, the profitability of producing them 
domestically. Thereafter a corporatist industrial model emerged in Mexico propelled by 
the rise of the Partido Nacional Revolucionario (National Revolutionary Party).171 This 
new political movement ‘unified’ the interests of the government and industrial workers 
to promote national development.  
The administration of Lázaro Cárdenas in the mid-1930s, was heavily involved in 
worker’s organizations resulting in the creation of the Mexican Workers’ Confederation 
(Confederación de Trabajadores de México). In this, the majority of trade unions were 
organized and attached to the political party. The consolidation of this scheme provided 
the basis of both popular support for the industrial policies to protect Mexican 
manufacturers offering preferential tariffs, together with a tight control of industry wages 
through trade union arrangements. In the following decades (1950s and 1960s) high output 
growth and low (‘stable’) inflation rates would characterize the Mexican economy, a period 
also known as the desarrollo estabilizador (stabilizing development).172 
 For the case of Argentina, unquestionably the most prosperous Latin American 
country at the start of the twentieth century, the period after the Great Depression until 
the 1970s has been generally considered as a ‘growth reversal’.173 The country experienced 
a decline in GDP growth rates in relation to the United States and other advanced 
countries. However, manufacturing remained a fundamental sector in terms of employment 
and it witnessed substantial changes, including the emergence of important sectors such 
as transportation and machinery equipment. The new industries produced for the domestic 
market and a large share of these firms had foreign, especially British ownership (Taylor, 
1998). During these years, governments such as the administration of Juan Perón began 
to intervene directly in ‘national’ industries. Perón’s regime aimed at diversifying an 
economy that was dominated by food processing, leather, textiles, and other less-capital 
intensive industries.  
The five-year economic plans instructed by Perón raised industrial workers’ pay, 
but also included fostering high (and medium)-capital intensive industries like the 
machinery and transportation industries via subsidies and trade tariffs. Previously, during 
the so-called infamous decade (1930-1943) Argentinian trade unions had begun to occupy 
a space in public life which strengthened labor-industrialists negotiations which at the 
                                                          
171 The party was renamed later as Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) in 1946. 
172 The term ‘desarrollo estabilizador’ appeared for the first time in Mexico’s official annual economic report 
for the World Bank in 1970.  





time was formalized in the General Confederation of Labor (Confederación General del 
Trabajo). In the same way to their trade union’s counterparts in Mexico and Brazil, 
collective bargaining demands in Argentina were subject to labor productivity increases, 
a corporatist arrangement that supported import substitution policies of the Perón regime 
and subsequent governments.174 
 
Figure 4.3. Growth of total manufacturing nominal value added per worker and nominal 
compensations per worker in Mexico, Argentina, and Brazil, c.1950-1975 




















Note: Growth rates are annual average compound growth rates of nominal values in local 
currencies for the period 1947/1950 to 1974/75. Nominal compensations refer to the sum of 
total wages, salaries and other paid benefits. 
Source: See next section and appendix B. 
 
However, as figure 4.3 depicts, in spite of these arrangements, workers’ 
compensations lagged behind productivity (total value added per worker) during this 
period.175 The message of this overview of the institutional arrangements in the industrial 
sector is that overall labor productivity within each of these countries interacted not only 
with the level of tariff policies in specific branches. The prevailing corporatist schemes 
                                                          
174 During Peron’s regime (by 1955) the so-called Congreso de la productividad (Congress for productivity) 
was instituted aiming to align the interests of unions, industrialists, and government. 
175 Figure 4.3. is displayed purposely in nominal terms. Collective wage bargaining was usually set in nominal 
terms and were adjusted for inflation only after prolonged periods of time and/or the expiration of the 
collective contract. There is vast evidence indicating the existence of the ‘money illusion’ phenomena in 
these countries (e.g. Dornbusch and Edwards, 1991); workers preferred to see their nominal wages rise, giving 
them the illusion that their living standards were improving, even though in real (inflation-adjusted) terms 






imposed to compress industry wages were a key element for implementing the industrial 
policies during the years of import substitution. 
 
4.4   Data description, adjustments, and limitations 
 
Detailed statistical data of the industrial sector for most of the Latin American countries 
in the years previous to 1960 suffer from large discontinuities and inconsistencies. There 
have been various efforts to collect and reconstruct statistical information with a consistent 
time-span based on the SNA (System of National Accounts).  
For instance, ECLAC (Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
Caribbean) assembled country-based statistics on economic and social variables since 1930. 
Unfortunately, in their industry-specific studies most of the information related to the 
manufacturing sector is not disaggregated by the type of industrial activity or branch. 
Their aggregate results on ‘sector totals’ are derived from interpolations linking growth 
rates between missing years. On the other hand, the datasets of United Nations Industrial 
Development Organization (UNIDO) contain highly disaggregated data (3-digit level); 
however, their data only include the years after 1970.176  
For longer periods previous to 1970, the widely used historical datasets such as 
Mitchell (2007), Penn World Tables, Maddison (2007) and Bolt and van Zanden (2014) 
have provided a series of sound long-term GDP information which have been used to make 
international comparisons of output and productivity including Latin American 
countries.177 However, the issue of employing GDP at an aggregate level (or the share of 
manufacturing in total GDP) as proxy for industrial productivity is that these measures 
by themselves do not capture the intra-industry dynamics of a changing economy over 
time. The sectoral disaggregation by Timmer and de Vries (2009) (GGDC 10-sector 
database) comprises industrial sectors including manufacturing since the year 1950; yet, it 
does not further disaggregate by manufacturing branches.  
Therefore, the statistical data employed in this study draws on primary sources 
obtained from industrial censuses, or ‘censos industriales’ in Spanish/Portuguese 
(currently renamed as ‘censos económicos’ or ‘censo nacional económico’). These censuses 
are official country surveys of economic units elaborated by national statistical offices 
every three to five years depending on the country of analysis and cover the manufacturing 
branches of 3-digit level industries. 
In Argentina, national censuses have been conducted since 1869. In 1914, the census 
included a subsection devoted to the manufacturing sector labeled as ‘censo de las 
                                                          
176 The same applies for the ECLAC-PADI dataset (Program of Analysis of Industrial Dynamics). 
177 Another similar source is the Montevideo-Oxford Latin America database (MoxLAD) which covers 20 





industrias’. However, the disaggregation of manufacturing branches was conducted for the 
first time in 1934 and published the following year (1935). Similarly, in Mexico, the first 
censo industrial was conducted by 1930. In Brazil, this statistical collection of 
manufacturing industries was conducted in 1939 and published in 1940. 
 
Consistency and adjustment 
 
For comparison purposes the present analysis establishes three reference benchmark-years 
according to the date that matched a similar census-year between these countries: 1935/39, 
1947/49/50, and 1974/75.178 
 
Table 4.3: Industry census country/year sample 
Country Reference year of census data 
Mexico 1935, 1950 1975 
Brazil 1939, 1949, 1975 
Argentina 1935, 1947, 1974 
Source: Data for Mexico is from Segundo Censo Industrial (1935), 
Quinto Censo Industrial (1957), Décimo Censo Industrial (1976); For 
Brazil, data is from Recenseamento geral do Brasil 1940, and 1950: 
Censo Industrial; and 1975 from IBGE, Censo Industrial: Brasil, Serie 
Nacional, Vol. 2, Part I, Rio de Janeiro, (1981). For Argentina data is 
from Censo Industrial de 1935 (Comisión Nacional del Censo 
Industrial 1938), Censo Industrial de 1947 (IV Censo General de la 
Nación 1946) and Censo Económico Nacional de la República de 
Argentina de 1973 y 1974 (1974). 
 
However, the information in these censuses cannot be compared directly in their 
original form for two main reasons; firstly, their classification methodology is different. 
Thus, I re-classified the industrial activities originally compiled by the national statistical 
offices to get a harmonized classification. I followed the one corresponding to the 
manufacturing codes of the ISIC (International Standard Industrial Classification, revision 
3) two-digit divisions or groups of three-digit major industries (see appendix A).179 
From these censuses, I use disaggregated data on value added, and employment for 
11 manufacturing branches.180 To achieve consistency in our estimates, I have 
                                                          
178 Other censuses for this period where available however only the mentioned ‘census dates’ matched across 
this country sample. For Argentina, the following industry census after 1947 was officially conducted for the 
year 1954; therefore, I opted to include the former (IV Censo Industrial 1947). 
179 In this study ‘aggregated’ various 3-digit level industries into 2-digit level in order to make cross-country 
comparisons following a standard ISIC classification (see appendix A).  
180 Data of investments by industry were not included in this analysis. Besides the additional data and 






constructed/adjusted the value added figures into the modern definition of gross value 
added introduced in 1993 in the SNA.  
The branches analyzed are: Food, Beverages, and Tobacco (ISIC 31), Textile, 
Textile Products, and Wearing Apparel (321), Leather, Leather Products and Footwear 
(323+324), Wood, Wood Products, and Cork (33), Paper, Printing and Publishing (34), 
Chemical Products, Rubber and Plastic Products (355+356), Non-metallic Mineral 
Products (36), Basic and Fabricated Metals (37+381), Machinery and Transport 
equipment (382+384), Electrical Machinery, Electrical Apparatus, and Precision 
Instruments (383) and Other Manufacturing (Miscellaneous) (385+39). 
The second reason why these figures should be properly adjusted for comparison 
purposes is the changing value of currency units over time. All data of gross value added 
by industry/branch are originally expressed in their own local currencies. However, to 
compare industrial productivity across countries and sectors, an important issue arises in 
converting real value added into common currency units.  
The proper rate of exchange in common currencies is to use a PPP (Purchasing 
Power Parity).181 Recent research has shown that relative prices vary largely across 
tradable and non-tradable sectors and using aggregate PPPs raises doubts in converting 
production-side figures (see e.g. Bernard and Jones 1996).  
Ideally, the proper way to adjust and deflate our data would have been to take 
manufacturing unit value ratios based on the production surveys and to construct 
industry-specific PPPs (see, Inklaar and Timmer, 2013). The ‘industry of origin’ 
methodology has been a common technique to derive price indices by industry taking unit 
values for each specific product, and matching them with its counterpart (or with the 
United States). 
However, a major drawback to construct deflators based on unit-value ratios for 
these countries is that the official industry censuses published in those years do not report 
data on quantities and values of the goods produced in each industry which are necessary 
for that adjustment technique. This adjustment issue could raise concerns on the data 
employed in this study especially considering the government price-setting schemes that 
kept the prices of most import-substituted goods artificially low, and the hyperinflation 
                                                          
recorded over time is much less consistent than value added or employment series for cross-country 
comparisons. Information on hours-worked were not available in these surveys. 
181 Maddison and van Ark (1989) conducted a comparative study of Brazil, Mexico and the United States 
for the year 1975 to derive PPPs based on an ‘industry of origin’ approach. However, their study (in order 
to match the prices of industrial items/products) selected only 38 and 47 percent of the manufacturing 
censuses for Brazil and Mexico respectively. The present study included the ‘total’ of the manufacturing 





episodes in Argentina during the Perón era (1950s) and the years around the mid-1970s 
(a similar case in Brazil).182  
In order to solve this data issue, I follow an alternative approach to adjust gross 
value added: I employ information of the price changes of the commodities traded between 
industries before retail; that is from a producer price index. Thus, this study uses 
‘wholesale price indices’ of each country to adjust the disaggregated nominal figures into 
constant terms (base 1975=100).183 After adjusting for inflation, I converted the data into 
1975 dollars using US exchange rates for the respective years of analysis. I follow this 
adjustment drawing on the quantitative findings by Maddison and van Ark (1989) that 
established that the PPP exchange rates of Mexico and Brazil did not vary substantially 
from those countries’ market exchange rates with the US dollar in 1975.184  
In order to verify the robustness of this assumption and check whether the price 
dynamics within manufacturing industries evolved in the same direction as the aggregate 
(total economy) wholesale price deflator, I derived a disaggregated wholesale price index 
for Brazil based on a combination of secondary data (see appendix B ‘prices’). With this, 
I proceeded to make adjustments on the industry census data comparing estimates (on 
gross value added) with disaggregated and aggregated wholesale price deflators. The 
deflation procedure was applied to the data for the benchmark years of the country in 
accordance to the censuses mentioned above (table 4.3); however, it is important to 
determine if price changes within branches differed across time.  
As shown in figure 4.4, wholesale price trends of other sectors did differ from the 
‘total’ wholesale price index for Brazil. These differences are taken into account in this 
study in order to test whether this may impact the results of our productivity estimates. 
Another limitation is the range and coverage of the censuses. I am employing in 
total three industrial censuses across eleven aggregated branches for each of the three 
countries to ultimately establish three benchmark estimates. Industrial censuses for these 
countries do not cover seasonal workers and therefore, it can be argued that employment 
figures can be underestimated because they and part-time workers are not included. A 
possible solution would have been to compare industry employment with figures from 
population censuses; however, for this period such data were not available by type of 
industry in most of Latin American countries.  
 
 
                                                          
182 See this data adjustment issue in Frankema and Visker (2011) for the case of Argentina. 
183 I use average index numbers of one year prior, during, and one after the census reference year to derive 
the deflators because these censuses include data for the year prior to its publication (e.g. the average 
wholesale price index for Mexico in 1950 was derived from the unweighted average growth of the index for 
1949-1950). 






Figure 4.4: Wholesale price index, Brazil 1938-1947  
(1938=100) 
 
Source: Derived from Bulhões (1948). See detailed table in appendix B. 
 
The analysis follows a definition of labor productivity as the branch’s gross value 
added over total workers-engaged in the respective branch. It would have been preferred 
to employ hours worked for a more accurate productivity measure, however, due to the 
limitations of the original source already mentioned, I proceeded in using data on the 
number of persons engaged within each industrial branch.  
Labor shares are shown in table 4.4. They indicate that a large proportion of the 
labor force in all three countries in 1935/39 and 1947/50 were concentrated in ‘traditional’ 
or low-technology intensity branches such as food, and textile manufacturing (near to a 
quarter or a third of total employment) and to a lesser extent on medium-low or medium-
high-technology branches.185  
The picture changes by the mid-1970s where the shares in traditional branches 
declined relatively and employment began to spread out into other more sophisticated 
branches. For instance, the most dramatic change in Mexico and Brazil is that the share 
of the branch of textiles declined from 37% and 34.7% to 13.7% and 16.4% respectively.186 
This contrasts with a smaller share in textiles in Argentina. Its economic structure was 
more diversified relative to Mexico and Brazil already in 1935. In a technology-
                                                          
185 Categories of low, medium, and high-technology intensity are based on the OECD classification of R&D 
intensities. See in T. Hatzichronoglou, ‘ISIC Rev. 3 Technology intensity definition’. See detailed categories 
in the appendix of this chapter, table 4.2.D. 
186 However, as table 4.5 shows, the relative value added per worker in the leather and footwear branch 
remained extraordinarily high for the case of Brazil. Industry-case studies have indicated how the Brazilian 
government favored the generation of leather shoe exporting clusters. By the late-1970s, Brazil became the 









1938 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 1947
Total Food and beverages Textile products






classification view from 1950 to 1975 the branches that expanded the most in terms of 
employment were the ones based on medium-high technology intensity.  
Figure 4.5 shows the change in industrial employment over this period. It depicts according 
to a classification based on the OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development) extraordinary high growth rates of employment across industries, for 
Mexico and Brazil. Medium-high technology intensity branches reached around nine 
percent annually (compound growth rate).187  
                                                          
187 Changes in employment shares could have been also driven by the growth of the population or by 
increasing the rates of labor force participation. However, the discussion of this analysis focuses on the 







Figure 4.5. Growth of industrial employment by period according to classification of ‘technological intensity’ 


















































Low technology Medium-low technology Medium-high technology
 
Note: Based on OECD classification (Hatzichronoglou, 1997). Since the aircraft and pharmaceutical industry represented a very small share in 
total manufacturing employment during this period, the high-technology classification was not shown for graphical purposes. 





Table 4.4: Employment shares by manufacturing branch in Mexico, Argentina, and Brazil c.1935-1975 (%) 
 
Note: Data refers to total employment (workers + employees by branch). Shares are the ratio of total employment branch to total manufacturing.  
* Total sum may not sum up to 100 due to rounded decimals. 




Mexico  Argentina  Brazil 
1935 1950 1975  1935 1947 1974  1939 1949 1975 
Food, Beverages, and Tobacco 24.5 26.5 23.2  22.5 24.3 21.0  25.0 21.9 15.2 
Textile, Textile Products, and Wearing Apparel 37.0 30.0 13.7  16.0 19.2 13.0  34.7 31.7 16.4 
Leather, Leather and Footwear 5.2 1.3 2.9  3.2 5.1 3.1  1.8 1.6 0.9 
Wood, Products of Wood, and Cork 6.1 6.3 4.5  6.3 10.5 5.7  8.1 8.2 8.7 
Pulp, Paper, Printing and Publishing 4.8 4.2 5.3  6.2 1.9 4.7  5.4 5.7 5.6 
Chemicals, Chemical Products, and Rubber 3.6 6.3 12.6  3.4 6.0 9.7  5.9 6.4 8.1 
Non-metallic Mineral Products 5.0 5.5 6.0  12.5 6.9 6.8  7.0 9.8 8.5 
Basic and Fabricated Metals 10.2 12.1 12.3  8.1 10.2 13.4  7.5 7.9 11.7 
Electrical Machinery, Electrical Apparatus, and Prec. Instrum. 1.0 1.7 6.8  5.1 2.1 4.4  0.6 1.2 4.6 
Machinery and Transport Equipment 0.9 4.7 10.7  9.1 10.2 17.1  2.5 3.6 16.2 
Other Manufacturing 1.8 1.5 2.0  7.5 3.5 1.0  1.3 2.1 4.0 






Table 4.5. Relative labor productivity levels by manufacturing branch in Mexico, Argentina, and Brazil c.1935-1975 
 
Industry 
Mexico  Argentina  Brazil 
1935 1950 1975  1935 1947 1974  1939 1950 1975 
Food, Beverages, and Tobacco  1.23 1.14 0.83  1.22 1.17 0.98  1.29 1.17 0.90 
Textile, Textile Products, and Wearing Apparel 0.89 0.63 0.63  0.85 1.14 0.81  0.83 0.76 0.58 
Leather, Leather and Footwear 0.70 0.74 1.77  1.00 0.92 0.52  1.00 2.68 2.50 
Wood, Products of Wood, and Cork 0.55 0.61 0.47  0.71 0.60 0.44  0.70 0.65 0.55 
Pulp, Paper, Printing and Publishing 1.15 0.95 1.07  1.45 1.01 0.98  1.00 1.08 1.08 
Chemicals, Chemical Products, and Rubber 1.49 1.83 1.69  1.25 1.47 2.06  2.05 1.68 2.35 
Non-metallic Mineral Products 1.13 0.72 0.87  1.09 1.05 0.68  0.80 0.72 0.71 
Basic and Fabricated Metals 0.86 1.64 1.11  0.83 0.85 1.09  0.19 1.20 1.05 
Electrical Machinery, Electrical Apparatus, and Prec. instrum. 1.61 1.08 0.86  0.38 0.85 0.99  3.30 1.34 1.20 
Machinery and Transport Equipment 0.69 0.88 1.10  0.97 0.75 0.94  1.50 1.10 1.03 
Other Manufacturing 1.37 0.65 0.70  0.64 0.73 0.53  0.89 0.88 0.79 
Total 1.00 1.00 1.00  1.00 1.00 1.00  1.00 1.00 1.00 
 
Note: Data refers to the level of value added per worker employed of branch relative to the total manufacturing value added per worker level 





In Argentina these branches (medium-high technology) did not exceed the growth 
of the medium-low and low ones. This feature is attributable to a catch-up effect. It has 
been documented how Argentina developed earlier (before the Great Depression, c.1910-
1920s) its manufacturing base, whereas the era of state ‘developmentalism’ in Mexico and 
Brazil started much later. Brazil and Mexico experienced an unprecedented ‘exponential’ 
growth in manufacturing per capita output between 1950 and 1975.188 Chenery et al., 
(1975) foresaw however, that those extraordinary high output growth rates would carry 
large structural imbalances in industrial employment and productivity in these 
countries.189 Nevertheless, the outstanding employment rates (for Brazil and Mexico) were 
only matched by the ones achieved in Korea and Japan over the same period (e.g. Dollar 
and Sokoloff, 1994). 
A paradox may appear at first sight when comparing table 4.5 with the global 
technology intensity classification (appendix 4.2.E). Several branches classified as ‘low-
tech’ (e.g. food, beverages, & tobacco) displayed high labor productivities relative to 
‘medium high-tech’ (e.g. electrical machinery). This feature may appear counterintuitive 
since it usually presumes that higher-technology intensive industries should be more 
productive then less-technology intensive.  
This presumption has been the focus of analysis in several industry-case studies in 
countries with a restricted access to the international knowledge stock or technology 
transfer (see a review in Tybout, 2000). According to Diaz-Alejandro (1965) in developing 
countries, inter-industry labor productivity differentials can be explained by the type of 
activity conducted within the industry.190 There are types of industrial branches that are 
‘process-centered’ (or machine paced), and ‘product-centered’ (or labor paced activities). 
On the latter type, productivity is more dependent on the quality of local labor and other 
resources, and vice versa for process-centred activities. Industry-case studies have revealed 
that although the labor productivity differentials between advanced and less-advanced 
industrial countries tends to be larger in process-centered industries (e.g. chemicals, non-
metallic minerals), labor productivity growth in product-centered activities (e.g. leather, 
textiles) in developing countries experience relatively high labor productivity growth 
(inter-sectoral labor productivity growth rates), and therefore, a smaller differential 
between countries (advanced and less-advanced).  
This paradox occurs because the margin for improvement through ‘learning by 
doing’ in those activities is much wider than in machine paced activities. Particularly, a 
                                                          
188 See benchmark tables 4.1.B and 4.1.C in appendix A of this chapter.  
189 Similarly, Chenery et al., (1975) arrived at very high estimates of compound growth rates of industrial 
per capita output (near to 7% per year) during this period. 
190 Diaz-Alejandro (1965) and Teitel (1981) analyzed a modified version of the Hirschman hypothesis for a 
sample of Latin American countries. The original notion in broad terms refers to the conjecture that 
manufacturing productivity differentials between highly-industrialized countries and developing countries is 






large scope for high labor productivity growth (spillovers) is likely to appear in branches 
where the skills requirements of the workers is low (see for e.g. Pack 1988). For Latin 
America it has been documented that during this period ‘light’ industries displayed 
relatively high labor productivities particularly in those based on abundant local resources 
(see, Teitel 1981).191 
Nonetheless, this general observation on high labor productivity rates in low-tech 
branches relative to medium-high technology branches has relevant implications for the 
ensuing empirical examination.192 Firstly, because the apparent indistinct relation of 
technology intensity and labor productivity growth across the period may reveal the 
invariant effects of policy related to the ‘initial conditions’ of the existent comparative 
advantage that labor-intensive industries possessed at the start of the protectionist 
strategy. Secondly, for policy design reasons. Despite the relatively low labor productivity 
in branches regarded as more technology (medium-high) and capital intensive in early 
periods, the degree of support via import substitution was based on the widely held view 
(by Latin American policy makers) that the expansion of these (medium-high technology 
intensive) branches was the route to break with the existing labor specialization patterns 
and to become technologically independent.193  
However, since various low-technology manufacturing branches were highly 
productive at the start of import substitution (c.1935/1939), it does not necessarily imply 
that the notion of the reallocation of labor toward technology-intensive sectors to raise 
labor aggregate productivity is untenable. As mentioned, the reallocation away from low-
tech to medium high-tech industries was a deliberate policy effort to gain autonomy 
reducing the dependency from technology intensive imported goods. Although there is an 
intrinsic interaction between import substitution and the labor productivity dynamics 
(associated to pre-existent factor endowments), disentangling them statistically would 
have been only plausible with a sample selection control such as an ad-hoc counterfactual 
(e.g. productivity comparisons in a period of non-protected industries, i.e. autarky vs free 
trade). Thus, looking to maintain the measurement strategy of this chapter, the analysis 
                                                          
191 Due to the nature of the present census data it is not plausible to account for the level of ‘mechanization’. 
In order to accurately confirm the aforementioned feature, it would have required the inclusion of records 
of capital stock and the type of skills embodied within the industry/branch. 
192 Sandven et al., (2005) found that in OECD countries, taking both types of industries together (low and 
medium-low technology industries) they outweigh the corresponding value added per worker contribution 
of high-tech industries on aggregate labor productivity growth.  
193 As Prebisch (1964) contended, despite their high growth (labor-intensive), not all sectors possessed the 
same ability to inject dynamism to "propagate technical progress" in the long run. This was considered one 
of the most important preoccupations of the theorists of ECLAC. The creation of a capital goods industry 
was a priority because of the increasing dependency on these type of imports would imply that the balance 





focuses exclusively on the statistical claim of the historiography that aggregate labor 
productivity growth during this period was indeed enhanced through labor reallocation. 
The phenomenon of structural change entails that shift in the pattern of 
specialization of traditional into modern activities. Evidently, the labels ‘traditional’ and 
‘modern’ coined in the dual-economy framework are not the most accurate to describe the 
complexity of the evolution of structure of the Latin American manufacturing. The 
ensuing examination puts forth a decomposition of labor productivity into its main 
components looking to provide a more accurate description of the process of labor 
reallocation. 
 
4.5 Productivity decomposition methodology 
 
The industrial productivity decomposition employed in the present study relies on a 
standard ‘shift-share’ analysis framework. This has been used in several studies to measure 
the contribution of structural change to aggregate productivity growth (e.g. McMillan, et 
al., 2014).194 The decomposition technique has been also applied for cases within 
manufacturing industries to disentangle their sources of productivity growth (e.g. Timmer 
and Szirmai, 2000; and Wang and Szirmai, 2008). Most of these studies have analyzed the 
impact of the shifts in capital and labor inputs on productivity growth (total factor 
productivity).195 Due to the lack of comparable data on capital series for these countries 
during this period the analysis focuses exclusively on the effects of shifts of labor inputs 
on aggregate labor productivity growth.196  
 











்ୀଵ = ∑ ܮ ௜்ܲ ௜்ܵ௡௜ୀଵ             (1) 
 
ܮ்ܲ − ܮܲ଴ = ∑ ሺܮ ௜்ܲ − ܮ ௜ܲ଴ሻ௡௜ୀଵ ௜ܵ଴ + ∑ ሺ ௜்ܵ − ௜ܵ଴ሻܮ ௜ܲ଴௡௜ୀଵ + ∑ ሺܮ ௜்ܲ − ܮ ௜ܲ଴ሻሺ ௜்ܵ − ௜ܵ଴ሻ௡௜ୀଵ     (2) 
 
LPT is the aggregate labor productivity at year t;  
LP0 is the aggregate labor productivity at year 0; 
                                                          
194 The method was first introduced by Fabricant (1942). 
195 This disaggregation has become a standard in structural change studies; however, one of the main 
drawbacks is that it cannot provide evidence of the effects of changes from the demand side. 
196 According to Syrquin (1984: 78), the ‘complete’ measurement should include the impact of shifts in both 







LPTi is the labor productivity of branch i at year t; 
LP0i is the labor productivity of branch i at year 0; 
STi is the employment share of branch i at year t; 
S0i is the employment share of branch i at year 0. 
 
The first term (from left to right) in the right side of equation (2) denotes the effect 
of productivity growth within industries (industrial branches). This term can be 
interpreted as the contribution to productivity growth resulting from learning by doing, 
capital intensity, hours worked in the sector (branch). The second term measures the 
effect of reallocation of labor between branches with differing levels of labor productivity 
(also known as ‘static shift’ effect). A positive sign in the total sum of this term is also 
seen as a ‘structural bonus’:197 
 
∑ ሺ ௜்ܵ − ௜ܵ଴ሻܮ ௜ܲ଴ > 0௡௜ୀଵ             (3) 
 
The third (last term), is an interaction effect of productivity growth and labor 
shifts (known as ‘dynamic shift’ effect). This reflects the effect of shifts towards branches 
with higher than average or to lower than average productivity growth. This last term 
will have a positive effect on productivity growth if labor shifts to branches where 
productivity is improving more rapidly than the average. Conversely, it will have a 
negative contribution if labor moves to branches where productivity is increasing less 
rapidly than average productivity, when this is the case (when its total sum is negative), 
the term can be seen as a ‘structural burden’ effect: 
 
∑ ሺܮ ௜்ܲ − ܮ ௜ܲ଴ሻሺ ௜்ܵ − ௜ܵ଴ሻ௡௜ୀଵ < 0           (4) 
 
This last term also captures Baumol’s hypothesis derived from the ‘unbalanced 
growth’ model; since there are inherent differences between industries in their capabilities 
to raise labor productivity through technological progress, innovation, or capital 
deepening, labor may tend to move towards industries where productivity is growing 
slower (technologically stagnant industries). As a result, in the long-run, if this ‘structural 
burden’ persists it will generate a fall in the aggregate productivity growth rate.198 
In general, a positive total sum of both shifts effects (‘static effect’ plus ‘dynamic 
effect’) would reflect a process of structural change that boosts aggregate (labor) 
productivity growth. 
  
                                                          
197 See also in Peneder (2003). 








4.6  Results and discussion 
 
The analysis applied the shift-share model (equation 2) discussed in the previous section 
to the eleven manufacturing branches in each of the three countries. Tables 4.6 to 4.8 
report the results for each country on the contribution to productivity growth 
disaggregated by industrial branch. The column ‘total’ indicates the total contribution 
from intra-branch productivity growth (within effect) and the shifts between branches 




During the first period (1935-1950) of import substitution, industrial productivity 
growth in Mexico was driven predominantly by traditional branches (food, beverages; and 
textiles and wearing apparel). On the other hand, branches with relatively high-capital 
intensity (e.g. machinery or electrical apparatus) were unable to expand as ‘national’ 
industrial policies intended to promote. This salient feature appears when we look at the 
composition of the structural components of overall productivity growth (see table 4.6) 
which was dominated by a ‘within’ industry effect (91.2%). The contribution of labor 
reallocations related to a ‘structural bonus’ (static-shift effect), although positive had a 
very weak impact (0.4%).  
On the other hand, productivity growth due to reallocation to industries with high 
productivity growth reveals that 8.4% was derived from a dynamic shift effect. In the 
second period (1950-1975), Mexico’s aggregate labor productivity growth continued to 
accelerate (8.3%). During this period, other industrial branches such as chemicals and 
fabricated metals contributed to productivity growth (1.8 and 1.0% respectively). 
Moreover, the contribution from labor reallocation from static shifts was higher than in 
the previous period but still small. Although, the ‘structural bonus’ effect on productivity 
growth increased to 1.3%, and the interaction effect (dynamic effect) added up to around 






Table 4.6: Shift-share decomposition of manufacturing labor productivity growth in Mexico, 1935-1975 
Note: Data adjusted with Mexico’s branch-specific wholesale price indices. See appendix A. 
 
 1935-1950   1950-1975   
Industry Within Static Dynamic Total  Within Static Dynamic Total 
Food, Beverages, and Tobacco  1.745 0.025 0.145 1.915  1.756 -0.037 -0.221 1.498 
Textile, Textile Products, and Wearing Apparel 1.295 -0.062 -0.244 0.988  1.587 -0.096 -0.864 0.627 
Leather, Leather and Footwear 0.228 -0.028 -0.170 0.030  0.209 0.010 0.245 0.465 
Wood, Products of Wood, and Cork 0.242 0.001 0.008 0.251  0.236 -0.011 -0.067 0.159 
Pulp, Paper, Printing and Publishing 0.277 -0.007 -0.033 0.237  0.381 0.010 0.100 0.491 
Chemicals, Chemical Products, and Rubber 0.416 0.041 0.316 0.772  0.881 0.110 0.876 1.867 
Non-metallic Mineral Products 0.233 0.005 0.021 0.259  0.401 0.004 0.039 0.445 
Basic and Fabricated Metals 1.296 0.016 0.235 1.547  1.029 0.005 0.024 1.058 
Electrical Machinery, Electrical Apparatus, and Prec. instrum. 0.057 0.012 0.041 0.109  0.122 0.050 0.360 0.532 
Machinery and Transport Equipment 0.053 0.026 0.234 0.313  0.434 0.055 0.560 1.049 
Other Manufacturing 0.054 -0.004 -0.009 0.041  0.086 0.003 0.034 0.124 
  Sum of industry productivity growth 5.894 0.025 0.543 6.461  7.123 0.104 1.087 8.314 





Figure 4.6: Shift-share decomposition of aggregate labor productivity growth in Mexico’s 
manufacturing, 1935-1975 













Note: Sum of last row in table 4.6, ‘total contribution to growth of aggregate productivity’. 
 
Figure 4.6 displays a summary of the decomposition of the structural components 
of aggregate productivity growth in these periods in Mexico. It indicates that although it 
played a relatively minor a role in boosting overall labor productivity, structural change 
(the sum of between-industry shifts) contributed in 8.8% from the 1935-1950 period and 
14.3% from 1950 to 1975. These results suggest that there was a small but positive increase 
in the tendency of industrial labor moving into higher-productivity activities which 
promoted to some extent the rapid pace in aggregate labor productivity, particularly 
during the second period of analysis or the so-called desarrollo estabilizador (1950s-1960s). 
   
Argentina 
 
Most of the discussion in the literature on Argentina’s post-1930 relative economic decline 
has focused on the deterioration of the agricultural sector and the decline of the land-
labor ratio with little emphasis on the dynamics of the industrial sector (manufacturing).199 
Our new quantitative evidence based on industry shift-share estimates reports that 
although Argentine manufacturing was more diversified (in terms of employment shares) 
than Mexico (and Brazil), aggregate labor productivity growth was similarly driven by 
traditional branches (food and beverages, and textiles and wearing apparel).  
 
                                                          
199 Recently, Debowicz and Segal (2014) explored this lacuna through data simulations (on broad sectors: 






Figure 4.7: Shift-share decomposition of aggregate labor productivity growth in 
Argentina’s manufacturing, 1935-1974 













 Note: Sum of last row in table 4.7, ‘total contribution to growth of aggregate productivity’. 
 
 
For the period 1947-1974 other branches were involved in the acceleration of labor 
productivity; machinery, transport equipment, basic metals, and chemicals (see table 4.7). 
However, productivity gains from labor shifts were meager. For the first period (1935-
1947), although the dynamic effect was positive (1.5%), this was nearly offset by a 
negative ‘structural bonus’ (-1.3%). The overriding interpretation of this is that aggregate 
productivity growth was driven by growth ‘within’ industries in Argentina (99.7%). 
During the second period (1947-1974), there was a slight change of labor moving out to 
more productive branches (gains from dynamic shifts accounted 10.9%).  
Yet, as figure 4.7 summarizes, structural change did not play an important role in 
explaining aggregate productivity. Its contribution after 1947 in Argentina was higher 






Table 4.7: Shift-share decomposition of manufacturing labor productivity growth in Argentina, 1935-1974  
Note: Data was adjusted with Argentina’s total wholesale price indices. See appendix A. 
 1935-1947   1950-1974  
Industry Within Static Dynamic Total   Within Static Dynamic Total 
Food, Beverages, and Tobacco  0.475 0.012 0.021 0.508  1.333 -0.042 -0.195 1.097 
Textile, Textile Products, and Wearing Apparel 0.386 0.022 0.062 0.470  0.839 -0.073 -0.278 0.489 
Leather, Leather and Footwear 0.052 0.018 0.027 0.097  0.135 -0.019 -0.054 0.063 
Wood, Products of Wood, and Cork 0.061 0.029 0.038 0.129  0.256 -0.029 -0.118 0.109 
Pulp, Paper, Printing and Publishing 0.087 -0.065 -0.061 -0.040  0.107 0.028 0.159 0.294 
Chemicals, Chemical Products, and Rubber 0.100 0.031 0.070 0.200  0.753 0.053 0.456 1.262 
Non-metallic Mineral Products 0.238 -0.065 -0.110 0.062  0.249 -0.002 -0.008 0.238 
Basic and Fabricated Metals 0.128 0.015 0.028 0.171  0.678 0.025 0.197 0.900 
Electrical Machinery, Electrical Apparatus, and Prec. instrum. 0.040 0.000 0.002 0.042  0.126 0.019 0.135 0.280 
Machinery and Transport Equipment 0.105 0.008 0.009 0.121  0.575 0.050 0.377 1.002 
Other Manufacturing 0.108 -0.027 -0.058 0.023  0.103 -0.009 -0.038 0.056 
  Sum of industry productivity growth 1.778 -0.022 0.027 1.783  5.155 0.002 0.733 5.890 








Brazil’s rapid growth after the Great Depression has been a well-documented feature in 
previous research. Studies have found that despite the fast pace of industrialization, the 
Brazilian economy continued relying on primary products, and its manufactured exports 
were mostly natural resource-based (Baer, 1994). 
Our shift-share results on Brazilian manufacturing report that this feature may 
only be accurate for the 1939-1949 period in terms of labor productivity (see table 4.8). 
Thereafter, from 1949 to 1975, although productivity growth decelerated (sum of industry 
productivity growth), it slightly shifted to other more sophisticated branches such as 
machinery and chemicals. A noticeable feature for the first period (1939-1949) is that 
there was a ‘structural burden’ (negative dynamic effect) on aggregate productivity led 
by shrinking traditional sectors (-0.4%). This suggests that the Brazilian manufacturing 
sector may have suffered from a problem of labor misallocation, possibly arising from ‘X-
inefficiency’ across firms, mainly those in traditional branches which could have accounted 
for the negative static and dynamic shift effects.200  
 
Figure 4.8: Shift-share decomposition of aggregate labor productivity growth in Brazil’s 
manufacturing, 1935-1975 













Note: Sum of last row in table 4.8, ‘total contribution to growth of aggregate productivity’. 
 
                                                          
200 On the other hand, Baer et al., (1987) have documented that the large foreign investment inflows into 
Brazilian private manufacturing particularly into companies producing machinery, electric equipment, and 







Table 4.8: Shift-share decomposition of manufacturing labor productivity growth in Brazil, 1939-1975 
 
 1939-1949    1949-1975   
Industry Within Static Dynamic Total   Within Static Dynamic Total 
Food, Beverages, and Tobacco  1.055 -0.037 -0.131 0.887  0.146 -0.078 -0.045 0.023 
Textile, Textile Products, and Wearing Apparel 0.994 -0.019 -0.088 0.887  0.140 -0.115 -0.067 -0.043 
Leather, Leather and Footwear 0.162 -0.008 -0.019 0.135  0.088 -0.019 -0.038 0.032 
Wood, Products of Wood, and Cork 0.189 0.001 0.002 0.192  0.038 0.003 0.002 0.044 
Pulp, Paper, Printing and Publishing 0.219 0.003 0.011 0.233  0.064 -0.001 -0.001 0.062 
Chemicals, Chemical Products, and Rubber 0.347 0.009 0.029 0.385  0.202 0.028 0.053 0.283 
Non-metallic Mineral Products 0.181 0.021 0.072 0.274  0.073 -0.010 -0.010 0.053 
Basic and Fabricated Metals 0.343 0.003 0.015 0.361  0.074 0.046 0.036 0.156 
Electrical Machinery, Electrical Apparatus, and Prec. instrum. 0.020 0.018 0.018 0.055  0.013 0.046 0.039 0.098 
Machinery and Transport Equipment 0.092 0.015 0.039 0.146  0.034 0.139 0.119 0.291 
Other Manufacturing 0.042 0.006 0.025 0.073  0.015 0.017 0.014 0.046 
  Sum of industry productivity growth 3.644 0.012 -0.027 3.629  0.887 0.057 0.102 1.046 
  Total contribution to growth of aggregate productivity  100.4% 0.3% -0.7% 100%   84.8% 5.4% 9.8% 100% 





Figure 4.8 depicts yet again that aggregate productivity was dominated by growth 
within industries in both periods. From 1949 to 1975, a slight proportion of it was induced 
by structural change, contributing 15.2% to overall labor productivity growth in Brazil. 
 
Is Rodrik wrong? 
 
The evidence presented has indicated a very limited effect of structural change on 
aggregate productivity growth. Contrary to this, recent analyses by the economist Dani 
Rodrik have brought up a discussion on whether protectionist regimes can boost economic 
growth. In his book, One Economics, Many Recipes (2008) he states:  
 
“…Import-substituting industrialization (ISI) worked in Brazil, but not in 
Argentina” (p. 42) …the model (ISI) was quite effective in stimulating growth in a 
large number of developing countries, for example in Brazil, Mexico, and Turkey” 
(p. 50). 
 
The fragment cites as evidence estimates of aggregate TFP (Total Factor 
Productivity) growth rates from Bosworth and Collins (2003) where Brazil outperformed 
Argentina during the 1960-1973 period.201 The overall message that Rodrik tries to put 
forward is that similar economic policies and institutions have worked for some countries 
but not for several others. Moreover, he claims that an ‘unconventional’ set of policies 
(such as industry protection) can ignite and accelerate growth initially with ‘minimal’ 
institutional change. However, Rodrik argues that over time it becomes more difficult to 
sustain growth without the reforms that promote a long-term ‘sound’ institutional 
underpinning to maintain a productive dynamism.202  
Certainly, although Brazil and Argentina (and Mexico) had different initial 
institutional arrangements, their rapid growth from the 1930s until the 1970s was closely 
linked to their political economy model based on corporatism and industry protection. 
Following Rodrik’s argument, it is likely that the lack of economic and institutional reform 
by the end of the mid-1960s or early-1970s may have contributed to the subsequent 
breakdown of the model during the Latin American crisis of the 1980s. Also, the 
combination of other factors (high debt-to-GDP ratios, overvalued exchange rates, 1973 
oil shock, etc.) may have also contributed to the subsequent crisis.  
However, could have been the lack of structural change the underlying cause of the 
1980s crisis? McMillan et al. (2014) drawing on the findings of sectoral estimates by 
Timmer and de Vries (2009) argued that in fact, there was structural change during the 
period of protectionism in Latin America:  
                                                          
201 TFP growth rates reported for that period in Brazil and Argentina are 2.3 and 0.6 respectively. 





“…during the quarter century between 1950 and 1975, the contribution of structural 
change to overall productivity growth was positive and large, of roughly the same 
magnitude as the within component” (p. 31). 
 
This notion is not incorrect but rather incomplete. As they show, during this period 
labor moved from agriculture to manufacturing and services contributing significantly to 
aggregate productivity growth. However, a view at a higher level of sectoral aggregation 
may mask the ‘specific’ effects of import substitution policies where manufacturing was 
the main targeted sector. The shift-share estimates from Timmer and de Vries (2009) 
referenced by McMillan and Rodrik (2011) employed a different dimension of structural 
change based on data from broad sectors across the economy (agriculture, manufacturing, 
and services).203 
The estimates presented in this chapter are quite different to previous broad 
examinations since these are based exclusively on manufacturing censuses disaggregated 
at the 3-digit level. Yet, these estimates could be seen as complementary evidence of the 
latter. Our estimates accounted for the effect of structural change on ‘total manufacturing’ 
productivity growth but not on the ‘total economy’ aggregate productivity as the latter 
study is referred to. 
It may not be implausible in attributing to various industrial policies in Latin 
America the ‘success’ of generating roughly 50% of ‘bonus’ on aggregate productivity 
growth from shifting the agricultural labor surplus into manufacturing (and services) as 
argued by previous authors. However, if the assessment of the effect of import substitution 
on structural change is viewed on the basis of how much of this bonus was gained from 
changing the structure of production inside the ‘targeted’ sector, then the shift-share 
examination broken down at the manufacturing level is more appropriate. 
Our evidence presented shows a less optimistic picture compared to Rodrik and 
other research using a different data aggregation. As mentioned, the bonus (structural 
change effect on productivity growth) accounted at most roughly 15% for Brazil (period 
1949-1975) and to a less extent in Mexico (14%) and Argentina (11%). Nonetheless, this 
meager contribution of structural change within manufacturing is not unusual. In 
comparative terms with other industrial sectors outside of Latin America, structural 
change in manufacturing also played a very limited role in the so-called East Asian growth 
miracle (post-1960s) which is usually portrayed as an example of successful industry 
‘interventions’.204  
                                                          
203 See ‘GGDC 10-sector database’ in www.ggdc.net 
204 ‘Industry interventions’ understood as selective industrial policies aiming to alter the structure of 
production towards sectors that offer greater prospects to accelerate overall economic growth (see Nolan and 




For instance, Timmer and Szirmai (2000) estimated that the structural change 
component in India contributed only about 10% to 15% on manufacturing (labor) 
productivity growth, whereas in other Asian economies like South Korea, Indonesia, and 
Taiwan this component was nearly zero or negative.205 Thus, what explanation can we 
draw in light on these similar findings?  
As in Harberger’s (1998) famous analogy on the shape of growth distributions, 
instead of expanding uniformly as yeast when baking bread in an oven, productivity 
growth in Latin America followed patterns in the shape of mushrooms. Resembling 
mushrooms in the forest bed, manufacturing labor productivity in this period ‘popped out’ 
sporadically only in specific branches. As argued by the growth literature a ‘yeast-type’ of 
productivity growth requires broad externalities which are related to the total stock of 
knowledge in the economy such as human capital. This ultimately could have been more 
important to boost growth uniformly rather than relying only on the structural change 
stemming from the dynamic effects of specific branches. 
However, this does not mean that the present findings are a case against industrial 
policy in Latin America. On the contrary, although major aggregate labor productivity 
improvements were driven ‘within’ growth of individual industries, the magnitude of at 
least this type of growth has not been replicated in the region since. As McMillan et al., 
(2014) indicate, patterns of structural change in Latin America not only have been absent 
after the 1980s, but since the 1990s (post-liberalization) have been even ‘growth-reducing’ 
for aggregate productivity growth.  
Besides, as previous studies have shown the success of industrial policies in raising 
overall welfare in East Asian countries did not generate extraordinary TFP growth rates 
or caused major technological breakthroughs. Instead, their selected industry interventions 
raised also labor productivity ‘within’ industries together with high rates of capital 
accumulation which in the end accounted the most for overall output growth (per 
capita).206  
As for Latin America, although it has been widely documented that import 
substitution had an anti-export bias that persisted until its later stages (1970s), Taylor 
(1998) has pointed out that the productivity divergence with their East Asian counterparts 
may have been not only related to the failure of creating a comparative advantage in the 
export sector; instead, the failure could be traced to the low capital-investment path that 
these economies experienced throughout this period relative to East Asia. Although more 
research is needed on whether Latin American manufacturing industries were operating at 
a sub-optimal level or with low capital intensity levels relative to other catch up economies 
                                                          
205 Most of the increases of aggregate productivity growth in these countries were found driven by growth 
‘within’ branches. See also an analysis on TFP growth comparison in Dollar and Sokoloff (1994). 




during this period, the nature of the data in the present estimations prevents us to go 
further on that issue.207 
Nevertheless, it is necessary to highlight that most recent macroeconomic analyses 
on Latin America have usually blamed liberalization and the effects of globalization of the 
1980s decade as the main drivers of the industrial productivity divergence relative the rest 
of the world. Our analysis has shown that the roots of industrial retardation predates the 
1980s. The drivers of productivity divergence were engendered during the years of 
protectionism (between 1930 and 1975) characterized by the inability to diversify and shift 
the structure of production out of traditional activities towards the ones with higher value 
added which ultimately may have led to an industrial base that was highly vulnerable to 
the international competition under liberalization.  
Yet, our estimates require caution in deriving policy implications. In addition to 
the data constraints, estimates are based on a standard shift-share analysis that omits 
other important factors that may also be considered as ‘structural change’; changes on the 
demand side of the economy; the possibility of increasing returns to scale in targeted 
industries; and inter-industry knowledge spillovers derived from innovation and 
technological breakthroughs or from newly created backward/forward linkages of 
intermediate inputs. 
 
4.7 Summary and conclusions 
 
This chapter aimed to re-examine an historical feature that has been a matter of recent 
discussions of industrial policy in Latin America: the impact of structural change on 
productivity under protectionism (namely ‘import substitution’). The main rationale of 
these policies was the potential generation of a ‘structural bonus’ (positive externality) 
arising from protecting a sector/branch with a ‘latent’ comparative advantage.  
Notwithstanding the limitations of the empirical methodology and data, our results 
have set this discussion into a broad country-case historical context using unexplored 
records of disaggregated statistical information for Mexico, Argentina, and Brazil. 
Evidence from this data shows that under this policy regime, although employment and 
productivity in many industries grew in real terms at unprecedented high levels with 
relatively high tariffs, little was accomplished to enhance structural change in the 
manufacturing productivity of these three major countries. 
Reallocation of labor within the sector did not provide an extra bonus to aggregate 
productivity growth in addition to growth ‘within’ individual branches. Most of these 
branches (food and beverages; textiles and wearing apparel) were in nature labor-intensive 
                                                          
207 Existent studies for Brazil and Mexico on this issue are only for the period prior to the 1930s. See a review 




and contributed the most to overall productivity growth. Needless to say, one of the broad 
accomplishments of import substitution was the development of a productive ‘light’ 
manufacturing; however, despite the government incentives in protecting other more 
relatively sophisticated sectors (machinery, transport equipment, and chemicals) with 
capital-intensive technologies, productivity growth remained ‘stuck’ into traditional 
industrial activities.208  
Williamson (2011) has documented how most of Latin American countries were 
catching up in aggregate manufacturing with the ‘industrial core’ during this period. Yet, 
by disaggregating productivity growth in the manufacturing sector this chapter found that 
growth was driven by traditional industries (low-technology intensity) and very sparsely 
by sophisticated ones (medium-high technology intensity). Ultimately the persistence of 
this unbalanced pattern in manufacturing throughout the years (1935-1975) was likely the 
fallout of the meager export performance and a ‘chronic’ balance of payments problem 
experienced in the wake of the 1980s debt crises. As the economist Clark W. Reynolds 
(1978) once quoted for the case of Mexico’s stable growth pattern: “the stabilizing 
development was actually destabilizing”. 
A further debate exists on why these countries failed to move from a manufacturing 
industry dependent on tariffs to a ‘Schumpeterian-type’ industry characterized by 
continually introducing cost-reducing processes and technologies as their East Asian 
counterparts accomplished during the same period. Most of the explanations have focused 
on the poor design of national policies regarding tariff protection in Latin America.209  
However, the question that should be addressed from a political economy 
perspective is why if the prevalent structure of protection did not generate structural 
change by the 1950s (as shown in this chapter) this was not re-arranged or reversed.210  
Instead these policies persisted for the following two decades up until the debt crises in 
the 1980s indicating the existence of an endogenous tariff protection.  
In other words, tariff policies did not target adequately those activities with a 
potential comparative advantage. Instead, these might have been influenced by the desire 
to aid declining sectors or/and protect the interests of large unproductive firms. As noted 
by Taylor (1998), Latin American policymakers confused “support for industrialization 
                                                          
208 Although there is evidence suggesting that there were other more successful ‘non-tariff’ policies such as 
the Brazilian BEFIEX (Special Fiscal Benefits for Exports) scheme which provided incentives for exports of 
domestic manufactures, many studies have shown that in spite of the diversification of Brazilian exports, 
many of these products did not meet international quality standards. 
209 Numerous studies have shown that the imports-GDP ratio in these countries did not fall as intended. 
Countries’ vertical integration of production had a heavy reliance on machinery imports and foreign capital, 
generating as a result an unsustainable position in their balance of payments. See Hirschman (1968) and 
Bruton (1998) for a general overview, and Katz and Kosacoff (2003) for the particular case of Argentina. 
210 During the military regime around the year 1976 Argentina lifted its protectionist measures in 




with support for industrialists” generating costly distortions for the long run.211 This 
argument is inexorably associated to the issue of institutional quality and how developing 
good economic institutions may be a prerequisite for an effective industrial policy. 
Evidently, the region is large and now also comprises other major countries that in 
recent years have been more successful in diversifying their economies and gaining speed 
in the ‘productivity race’ such as Chile, and Uruguay. A future step in cliometric research 
would be to explore whether their current industrial success was shaped by the 
accumulation of capabilities from earlier industrial policies such as import substitution. 
                                                          





Appendix A to Chapter 4: Gross value added and employment 
 
In order to make cross-country comparisons I re-ordered the industrial branches that 
matched the international classification described above. Therefore, for the case of the 
Brazilian industrial censuses (1939-1975) we excluded the mining branches referring to 
extractives industries (industrias extractivas) of mineral and vegetable products 
(productos minerais and productos vegetais) and focused only on manufacturing branches 
(industriais de transformação) which represented roughly 95-96% of coverage of all 
industrial censuses (total employment). 
 
Adjustments to ‘value added’ figures 
 
Mexico: The information in Mexican industry censuses does not report estimates of value 
added. However, the censuses have enough information to arrive at an estimate that is 
similar to the concept of value added of the 1993 SNA (System of National Accounts) and 
have a level of compatibility with Argentina and Brazil. Mexican gross value added was 
constructed directly from the census ﬁgures as the total value of products (producción 
total) minus the cost of raw materials (materias primas utilizadas), purchased fuel and 
electricity (combustibles y electricidad consumida) and other production expenses (Otros 
gastos de producción). For Brazil and Argentina, value added figures in their censuses 




Mexico: Mexican industry censuses only include paid workers. The censuses covered by 
this study took the employment figures by branch referred as ‘Personal ocupado’. The 
branches included were the ones disaggregated in the sub-sector ‘industrias de la 
transformación’, and thus, excluding extractive industries, agriculture, fisheries and 
forestry. Brazil: Data refers to column to total sum of ‘Pessoal occupado’ and the branch 
selection is the same as the one chosen for value added described above. Argentina: 





                                                          
212 Official exchange rates of 1975: Following Officer (2011) exchange rates for 1975, in Mexico the ‘Peso’ 
was 12.50 per dollar, Brazil’s ‘Cruzeiro’ in January of the same year was 8.13 per dollar and for Argentina, 




4.1.A: Comparative benchmark of levels of gross value added per person employed in 
Mexico, Argentina, and Brazil in 1935/39 
(Constant US dollars of 1975) 





Food, Beverages, and Tobacco 167 575 169 
Textile, Textile Products, and Wearing Apparel 124 398 60 
Leather, Leather and Footwear 98 468 420 
Wood, Products of Wood, and Cork 99 334 138 
Pulp, Paper, Printing and Publishing 204 684 196 
Chemicals, Chemical Products, and Rubber 193 588 214 
Non-metallic Mineral Products 202 514 158 
Basic and Fabricated Metals 128 392 61 
Electrical Machinery, Electrical Apparatus, and Prec. Instr. 98 179 648 
Machinery and Transport Equipment 89 456 295 
Other Manufacturing 151 301 175 
Total 142 471 135 
Source: Text of Appendix A. 
 
 
4.1.B: Comparative benchmarks of levels of gross value added per person employed in 
Mexico, Argentina, and Brazil in 1947/49/50 
(Constant US dollars of 1975) 





Food, Beverages, and Tobacco 498 609 292 
Textile, Textile Products, and Wearing Apparel 262 593 188 
Leather, Leather and Footwear 301 476 668 
Wood, Products of Wood, and Cork 271 309 161 
Pulp, Paper, Printing and Publishing 411 526 269 
Chemicals, Chemical Products, and Rubber 781 764 417 
Non-metallic Mineral Products 343 547 179 
Basic and Fabricated Metals 808 440 300 
Electrical Machinery, Electrical Apparatus, and Prec. Instr. 433 441 333 
Machinery and Transport Equipment 408 388 273 
Other Manufacturing 266 379 219 
Total 445 519 249 







4.1.C: Comparative benchmark of levels of gross value added per person employed in 
Mexico, Argentina, and Brazil in 1974/1975 
(Constant US dollars of 1975) 





Food, Beverages, and Tobacco 1,001 861 1,077 
Textile, Textile Products, and Wearing Apparel 759 713 699 
Leather, Leather and Footwear 2,132 862 2,749 
Wood, Products of Wood, and Cork 567 391 652 
Pulp, Paper, Printing and Publishing 1,282 867 1,290 
Chemicals, Chemical Products, and Rubber 2,033 1,023 2,810 
Non-metallic Mineral Products 1,047 599 853 
Basic and Fabricated Metals 1,338 964 1,251 
Electrical Machinery, Electrical Apparatus, and Prec. Instr. 1,037 878 1,436 
Machinery and Transport Equipment 1,322 826 1,191 
Other Manufacturing 839 470 948 
Total 1,204 883 1,196 
Source: Text of Appendix A. 
 
Appendix B to chapter 4: Prices 
 
Wholesale prices: indices of the aggregate wholesale prices for the three countries were 
taken from the historical series of Mitchell (2008). The original data series were re-based 
to the year of 1975. To check for consistency, I compare for Mexico its trend with Mexico 
City’s wholesale price index (Índice de precios al mayoreo) provided by INEGI (Instituto 
Nacional de Estadística Geografía e Informática) from 1930-1960 and the Montevideo-
Oxford Latin America dataset (MoxLaD) for 1960-1975. For Brazil I compare it with the 
IBGE (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografía e Estatística) series IPA (índice de preços por 
atacado). 
 
Branch-specific wholesale price indices 
 
Brazil: Indices were derived from the series of de Bulhões (1948) and inflation rates were 
re-based to 1938 as reference year. Data was originally disaggregated into six branches 
(Food & beverages, Textiles, Chemicals, Metals, Fuel, and Miscellaneous). These series 





Mexico: Disaggregated indices were based on estimates by the Bank of Mexico in Series 
Históricas de Precios, compiled by INEGI in 2009’s Estadísticas Históricas de México. 
Original series had 1978 as base year, thus, these were also re-based into the year 1975 for 
consistency. 
 
























products Fuel  Miscellaneous 
1938 100  100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
1939 104  102 102 101 105 106 119 101 
1940 107  107 108 104 144 115 137 110 
1941 133  125 139 113 143 129 153 124 
1942 159  148 158 136 201 173 196 143 
1943 181  173 175 166 216 192 229 164 
1944 193  206 208 206 220 190 241 178 
1945 226  239 252 242 207 183 253 190 
1946 263  285 306 295 186 176 255 219 
1947 319  283 337 265 171 188 253 228 





Table 4.2.B: Wholesale price indices for Mexico by manufacturing branch 1939-1975 























1939 10.43 10.21 10.98 7.96 9.52 23.39 11.04 12.94 
1940 10.79 10.83 11.64 8.16 10.00 23.39 11.26 14.99 
1941 11.33 10.83 11.80 8.98 10.81 25.48 12.39 16.43 
1942 12.05 11.67 13.61 10.61 12.26 23.91 13.29 19.51 
1943 14.39 14.17 13.61 13.27 13.39 26.00 13.51 24.44 
1944 16.73 16.04 15.90 15.10 14.03 26.35 13.74 27.52 
1945 19.06 18.75 14.43 16.12 13.87 26.35 13.74 28.34 
1946 22.30 20.42 12.79 19.59 15.81 26.00 13.96 29.98 
1947 23.20 21.67 17.21 19.80 19.03 28.45 18.24 30.18 
1948 25.72 22.71 29.67 23.27 22.42 34.38 22.75 31.62 
1949 26.44 25.21 34.10 25.92 27.74 46.25 32.43 32.85 
1950 26.80 28.33 29.34 29.80 29.68 51.13 35.14 35.73 
1951 31.47 31.25 38.85 40.41 32.58 54.28 38.51 60.16 
1952 34.35 33.33 37.87 39.18 34.68 56.02 39.86 44.97 
1953 34.35 33.33 31.48 38.57 35.00 58.12 40.09 44.35 
1954 36.69 35.63 35.25 44.90 37.74 70.33 48.65 47.23 
1955 39.93 40.63 42.79 50.20 40.48 78.53 56.08 50.31 
1956 41.19 42.29 42.13 50.20 45.16 80.80 59.46 51.75 
1957 42.27 43.75 41.31 50.20 48.39 82.72 64.19 54.83 
1958 44.06 45.42 42.79 49.59 50.16 83.42 68.69 55.65 
1959 46.04 45.83 44.59 46.73 50.16 84.29 72.52 59.96 
1960 47.84 46.46 42.95 50.41 49.68 84.99 73.20 66.74 
1961 48.56 48.75 42.95 51.02 50.32 85.51 73.42 61.40 
1962 48.92 51.88 42.95 48.57 50.32 83.77 74.55 60.37 
1963 49.10 51.67 42.95 49.59 50.16 83.07 75.00 61.40 
1964 49.82 51.88 42.95 52.45 51.13 83.77 76.80 63.45 
1965 50.90 54.17 42.95 53.06 52.26 83.60 77.03 65.71 
1966 51.08 55.63 42.95 51.43 52.10 80.98 81.53 66.74 
1967 50.72 57.08 42.95 52.04 52.58 80.80 81.76 67.76 
1968 52.88 57.29 42.95 51.43 54.03 80.80 81.76 68.99 
1969 54.50 59.58 42.95 53.67 55.00 80.80 81.76 69.82 
1970 56.29 61.88 42.30 56.53 59.19 81.85 81.98 71.46 
1971 66.37 63.13 44.92 55.51 60.00 82.20 81.98 71.66 
1972 66.91 66.25 47.54 58.78 60.00 82.02 79.95 75.36 
1973 69.42 75.42 52.95 84.08 61.45 84.64 84.46 80.70 
1974 89.57 88.13 90.98 97.96 83.23 91.97 86.94 95.69 
1975 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Note: Original data labels of the categories were re-labelled from Spanish to English as follows: Food and beverages are 
‘Alimentos elaborados’; Textiles & apparel are ‘No-alimentos de uso personal’; and Miscellaneous is ‘otros’. 





Table 4.2.C. Wholesale price index of Mexico, Argentina, and Brazil (1975=100) 
Year Mexico Argentina Brazil  
1934 6.06 0.02  
1935 6.06 0.02  
1936 6.39 0.02  
1937 7.60 0.03 0.05 
1938 8.08 0.03 0.04 
1939 8.00 0.03 0.05 
1940 8.25 0.03 0.05 
1941 8.89 0.03 0.06 
1942 9.62 0.04 0.07 
1943 11.64 0.04 0.08 
1944 14.39 0.04 0.09 
1945 15.76 0.05 0.10 
1946 18.19 0.06 0.12 
1947 19.16 0.06 0.14 
1948 20.70 0.07 0.16 
1949 22.64 0.08 0.18 
1950 24.98 0.10 0.21 
1951 30.80 0.15 0.25 
1952 31.93 0.19 0.27 
1953 31.45 0.22 0.31 
1954 34.36 0.22 0.40 
1955 39.05 0.24 0.45 
1956 40.91 0.31 0.55 
1957 42.68 0.38 0.61 
1958 44.62 0.50 0.69 
1959 45.11 1.17 0.95 
1960 47.29 1.35 1.24 
1961 47.70 1.46 1.72 
1962 48.59 1.91 2.63 
1963 48.83 2.46 4.56 
1964 50.93 3.11 8.71 
1965 51.90 3.85 13.24 
1966 52.55 4.63 18.29 
1967 54.08 5.78 22.82 
1968 55.05 6.34 28.22 
1969 56.51 6.74 33.97 
1970 59.82 7.71 41.46 
1971 62.09 10.72 50.17 
1972 63.86 18.96 59.76 
1973 73.89 28.50 68.47 
1974 90.54 34.49 88.76 
1975 100.00 100.00 100.00 





4.2.D Census aggregation into ISIC Classification rev. 3 
Industry classification ISIC  Description 
Food, Beverages, and 
Tobacco  15-16 
Manufacture of food products and beverages + Manufacture of 
tobacco products 
Textile, Textile Products, 
and Wearing Apparel 17-18 
Manufacture of textiles + Manufacture of wearing apparel; 
dressing and dyeing of fur 
Leather, Leather and 
Footwear 19 
Tanning and dressing of leather; manufacture of luggage, 
handbags, saddlery and harness + Manufacture of footwear 
Wood, Products of Wood, 
and Cork 20+30 
Manufacture of wood and wood and cork products + 
Manufacture of furniture and fixtures + office furniture 
Pulp, Paper, Printing and 
Publishing 21+22 
Manufacture of paper and paper products + Publishing + 
Service activities related to printing 
Chemicals, Chemical 
Products, and Rubber 23+24+25 
Manufacture of coke oven products + Manufacture of refined 
petroleum products + Manufacture of basic chemicals + 
Manufacture of other chemical products + Manufacture of 
rubber and plastic products 
Non-metallic Mineral 
Products 26 
Manufacture of glass and glass products + Manufacture of non-
metallic mineral products 
Basic and Fabricated Metals 27+28 
Manufacture of basic iron and steel + Manufacture of basic 
precious and non-ferrous metals + Casting of metals + 
Manufacture of structural metal products, and reservoirs and 
steam generators + Manufacture of other fabricated metal 
products; metalworking service activities 
Electrical Machinery, 
Electrical Apparatus, and 
Precision Instruments 
31+32+33 
Manufacture of television and radio transmitters and apparatus 
for line telephony and line telegraphy + electric motors, 
generators and transformers + Manufacture of electricity 
distribution and control apparatus + Manufacture of insulated 
wire and cable + Manufacture of electric lamps and lighting 
equipment + Manufacture of medical appliances and 
instruments and appliances for measuring + optical 
instruments and photographic equipment + Manufacture of 
watches and clocks 




Manufacture of general purpose machinery + special purpose 
machinery + Manufacture of motor vehicles + Manufacture of 
parts and accessories for motor vehicles and their engines + 
Manufacture of railway and tramway locomotives and rolling 
stock 
Other Manufacturing - 
Manufacture of jewellery and related articles; musical 
instruments; sporting and athletic goods; and manufacturing 





4.2.E: Manufacturing industries classified according their global technological intensity 
 
Low-technology ISIC 
Wood and furniture; Paper, printing, publishing  20-22 
Textiles and clothing  17-19 
Food, beverages, and tobacco  15-16 
Recycling  36-37 
Medium-low-technology   
Rubber and plastic products  25 
Shipbuilding  351 
Non-ferrous metals  36 
Non-metallic mineral products  26 
Fabricated metal products & ferrous metals 27-28 
Petroleum refining  23 
Medium-high-technology   
Machinery and equipment  29 
Motor vehicles  34 
Electrical machinery  31 
Chemicals  24 




Medical and precision instruments 33 
Computing machinery 30 
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